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Threat affects risk preferences in
movement decision making
Megan K. O’Brien* and Alaa A. Ahmed
Neuromechanics Laboratory, Department of Integrative Physiology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA
Emotional states such as sadness, anger, and threat have been shown to play a critical
role in decision-making processes. Here we addressed the question of whether risk
preferences are influenced by postural threat and whether this influence generalizes
across motor tasks. We examined risk attitudes in the context of arm-reaching (ARM)
and whole-body (WB) leaning movements, expecting that increased postural threat
would lead to proportionally similar changes in risk-sensitivity for each motor task.
Healthy young adults were shown a series of two-alternative forced-choice lotteries,
where they were asked to choose between a riskier lottery and a safer lottery on each
trial. Our lotteries consisted of different monetary rewards and target sizes. Subjects
performed each choice task at ground level and atop an elevated platform. In the
presence of this postural threat, increased physiological arousal was correlated with
decreasedmovement variability. To determine risk-sensitivity, we quantified the frequency
with which a subject chose the riskier lottery and fit lottery responses to a choice model
based on cumulative prospect theory (CPT). Subjects exhibited idiosyncratic changes
in risk-sensitivity between motor tasks and between elevations. However, we found
that overweighting of small probabilities increased with postural threat in the WB task,
indicating a more cautious, risk-averse strategy is ascribed to the possibility of a fall.
Subjects were alsomore risk-seeking in theWBmovements than in ARM at low elevation;
this behavior does not seem to derive from consistent distortions in utility or probability
representations but may be explained by subjects’ inaccurate estimation of their own
motor variability. Overall, our findings suggest that implicit threat can modify risk attitudes
in the motor domain, and the threat may induce risk-aversion in salient movement tasks.
Keywords: neuroeconomics, sensorimotor control, risk-sensitivity, postural threat, prospect theory
Introduction
Recent work suggests that an individual’s emotional state can dictate decisionmaking. For instance,
affective reactions to a stimulus, either positive or negative, can alter our subjective interpretations
of perceived risks and benefits, thereby impacting our cognitive processes and choices (Slovic, 1987;
Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002, 2004; Loewenstein and Lerner,
2003). Stress—such as one might experience before delivering a public speech or while immersing
one’s hand in icy water—has specifically been shown to modulate risk-sensitivity in economic
decision making. Stressed participants reduce their risk-taking behavior in the face of potential
monetary losses (Pabst et al., 2013), increase risk-taking for potential monetary gains (Buckert et al.,
2014), or vise versa (Porcelli and Delgado, 2009).
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How does emotion affect our movements? The
aforementioned connection between stress and decision
making highlights an intriguing yet underappreciated finding
in whole-body (WB) movement control. Particularly relevant
stressors in a movement domain are environments of postural
threat, which increase the consequences or probability of
unsuccessful movement, either implicitly or explicitly. Even
when there is a minimal increase in postural threat (such as
standing on a balance board), individuals significantly alter
their movement strategies (Huang and Ahmed, 2011; Manista
and Ahmed, 2012; Pienciak-Siewert et al., 2014). Elevation is
a common method of increasing postural threat that has a
marked effect of on movement strategies in WB movement
control. Standing on an elevated platform leads to increased
measures of physiological arousal, which indicates greater levels
of anxiety (Ashcroft et al., 1991; Brown et al., 2002, 2006).
And when asked to walk or stand on an elevated platform,
both young and old adults reduce the velocity and extent of
their postural movements (Carpenter et al., 1999, 2001, 2006;
Adkin et al., 2000, 2002, 2008; Brown et al., 2006; Davis et al.,
2009; Lamarche et al., 2009). Importantly, it appears that these
movement modifications are a function of the amount of threat,
wherein the central nervous system increasingly tightens its
control of posture with elevation (Adkin et al., 2000). While
changes in movement control on elevated platforms cannot be
explained by changes in biomechanical capacity, they can be
explained by risk-sensitive changes in decision making. Framing
WB movement in neuroeconomic terms suggests that these
movement-based changes can result from the feelings of threat
associated with standing on an elevated platform. For example,
placing higher subjective value on the consequences of a fall
or assigning more weight to the probability of a fall should
result in more cautious movement decisions. Such risk-sensitive
responses would explain the previously observed reductions
in postural excursion and velocity. If changes in movement
control on elevated platforms result from the feelings of threat
experienced while standing on the platform, then it is feasible
that these emotions will influence risk-sensitive behavior in
motor-based decision tasks as well.
Risk-sensitivity in movement has recently been explored
using a variety of behavioral and computational approaches,
particularly for arm-reaching (ARM) tasks. In discrete endpoint
planning, Trommershauser et al. (2003a,b) found subjects were
nearly able to maximize expected gain during a pointing task
(suggesting risk-neutrality), whereas Wu et al. (2009, 2011)
observed distortions in motor rewards and probabilities using
cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (suggesting risk-sensitivity).
Evidence of risk-sensitivity has also appeared during target
searches with a Bayesian integration model (Grau-Moya et al.,
2012), in sensitivity to effort with the mean-variance trade-
off (Nagengast et al., 2011), and in sensitivity to error with a
motor adaptation model (Trent and Ahmed, 2013). Previously,
we investigated risk-sensitivity in ARM and WB movements
using a continuous movement paradigm (O’Brien and Ahmed,
2013). Subjects maneuvered a cursor as close to the edge of
a virtual cliff as possible and received a point score based on
their performance. We found that in both movement tasks,
subjects moved closer to the cliff edge than predicted by a risk-
neutral model of movement planning, suggesting risk-seeking
behavior. We also saw greater risk-seeking behavior in the
WB movement than in arm-reaching; however, the cause of
such behavior was unclear. A follow-up study intimated that
differences in risk-sensitivity between the two tasks emerged
from the movements themselves rather than from the sitting
and standing postures (O’Brien and Ahmed, 2014). In the
present experiment, we specifically investigate whether risk-
seeking behavior in movement might have resulted from (i) an
inappropriate estimation of sensorimotor variability or (ii) a
distorted weighting of point rewards and penalties, by probing
subjects’ subjective valuation of probability and utility (reward)
during a movement task.
The main objective of this study was to examine the influence
of postural threat on risk preferences during movement decision
making and to assess whether this influence generalizes across
different motor tasks. Subjects were asked to choose between
risky lotteries in the context of two motor tasks: ARM and WB
leaning. They completed each task at ground level and atop
an elevated platform. Since individuals reduce the velocity and
extent of their movements under postural threat, we expected
that increasing postural threat in the form of elevation (low
vs. high) would lead to increased risk-aversion. This risk-
aversion could manifest itself as decreased subjective valuation of
movement rewards or as increased weighting of the probability of
a fall. We also expected to see proportionally similar changes for
bothmotor tasks; that is, if an individual becamemore risk-averse
in the ARM task at high elevation, that person would be equally
risk-averse in theWB task at high elevation. Findings of this study
are pertinent to the analysis of the influence of emotional state on
movement decisions under risk. Our results will help determine
whether there are generalizable principles such that movement
decision-making in various emotional states can be predicted and
trained across motor tasks.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Twenty right-handed, healthy subjects (13 females, 7 males;
mean age, 23.1 ± 2.8 years) participated in this experiment,
performing two motor lottery series in both the low-threat and
high-threat conditions. Fifteen of the 20 subjects repeated a
lottery series during the experiment, allowing us to assess within-
subject choice consistency. Thirteen of the 20 subjects were
part of a broader study examining the influence of threat on
non-motor and motor tasks (O’Brien and Ahmed, 2014). All
participants provided informed consent, and the experimental
protocol (12-0458) was approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Colorado Boulder in accordance
with federal regulations, university policies, and ethical standards
regarding human subject research.
Experimental Protocol
Subjects performed two motor choice tasks: one for seated
arm-reaching (ARM) and another for standing whole-body
leaning movements (WB). In each task, subjects were asked to
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choose between two lotteries, where each lottery has a different
monetary reward and probability of winning that reward. Rather
than offering explicit probabilities for these lotteries (e.g., 50%
chance of winning the reward), we gave subjects implicit
probabilities in the form of rectangular targets with variable
widths (e.g., such that a subject had a 50% chance of hitting the
target in a given motor task), wherein hitting the target results in
winning the reward.
Subjects underwent a testing session in both motor choice
tasks under two threat conditions: low elevation and high
elevation. In the low elevation condition (Low), subjects chose
between risky lotteries at ground level, either sitting in a chair
for the ARM task or standing at the edge of a forceplate for the
WB task. In the high elevation condition (High), subjects sat in
the same chair or stood on the same forceplate at the edge of
an elevated platform, 0.8m off the ground. The height of this
elevated platform is approximately the average height at which
young adults perceived they would not be able to use a step down
strategy to descend from an elevated surface (Brown and Frank,
1997).When standing in either elevation condition, subjects were
secured in a harness and fall protection system that could arrest
a fall before the subjects’ knees touched the platform. However,
to maintain perceptions of postural threat in the presence of
this added safety, there was enough slack to the harness to allow
subjects to move without restraint, and they were not allowed to
voluntarily explore the competence of the fall protection system.
Prior to testing at each elevation, subjects were given the
opportunity to practice actual movements in a training session.
In the ARM task, subjects used their dominant arm to grasp
the handle of a robotic manipulandum (Interactive Motion
Technologies Shoulder-Elbow Robot 2) and move a cursor from
a starting region to a target that was 12 cm directly in front of
them. In theWB task, subjects stood on a forceplate (AMTIDual-
Top AccuSway, which is 4.5 cm in height) and used their center
of pressure (COP) to move the cursor from a starting region to
a target that was 6 cm directly in front of them. Figures 1A,B
illustrate the physical configuration for the ARM and WB tasks,
respectively. The cursor was a yellow circle with a radius of
0.25 cm and a red vertical line through it to mark the center. The
target was a thin, white horizontal line traversing the computer
screen and a small, white vertical line at its center. Subjects were
instructed to make a quick out-and-back movement from the
starting region to the target, trying to move as straight as possible
to hit the center of the target with the center of the cursor.
However, the horizontal position of the cursor was obscured from
the time the cursor left the starting region until they crossed the
target line. Visual feedback of the cursor’s horizontal position
at the target distance was shown after each trial, supplying
information about their error relative to the center of the target.
We encouraged subjects to hit the target within 750–850ms by
providing feedback about their movement time after each trial.
During this feedback, the target flashed green if they moved
too quickly, gray if they moved too slowly, and yellow with an
auditory tone if they hit the target within the given time window.
Subjects performed 100 trials in both ARM and WB tasks. We
found that 100 trials were more than sufficient for participants
to reach asymptotic levels of performance in both the ARM
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup for motor tasks. Schematic of (A)
arm-reaching task (ARM) and (B) whole-body (WB) movement task. Subjects
executed out-and-back movements to a target during training and realization
of choices. (C) Subjects performed all movement and choice tasks at ground
level (Low elevation) and then at the edge of a 0.8m platform (High elevation).
and WB tasks, requiring approximately 20–40 trials to do so.
We explicitly told subjects to pay attention to their performance
throughout training, noting how close their cursor was to the
target center across trials. We explained that having some idea
of their accuracy would help them make decisions about relative
target sizes during the choice-based testing session.
During testing, subjects performed the ARM and WB lottery
tasks in a randomized order at each elevation, counterbalanced
across the two tasks. They completed both choice tasks at low
elevation before performing them at high elevation (Figure 1C).
It has been previously shown that increasing elevation results
in more pronounced changes to postural control variables than
decreasing elevation (Adkin et al., 2000). In always presenting the
Low elevation condition first, we intended to capitalize on these
order effects to maximize potential changes in risk-sensitivity due
to threat. Ideally, we would test and re-test as many conditions
as possible to examine consistency of choices over the different
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conditions. However, due to the overall length of the experiment
and to minimize mental fatigue, we had subjects repeat one of
these tasks, which we still used to examine choice consistency.We
selected the WB Low task as the condition to be repeated. Fifteen
of the 20 subjects performed this repeated condition, which
was included in the randomized conditions at Low elevation.
Lotteries were displayed on a computer monitor in front of the
subject. In the testing phase of the experiment, subjects simply
chose between pairs of lotteries, with every choice completing a
single trial. Subjects performed 72 choice trials for each motor
task. Within each trial, lottery information was shown for 4 s; the
lotteries then disappeared and subjects were given 2 s to select
their preferred lottery.
After completing the training and choice tasks at both
elevations, subjects participated in a realization of choices phase,
where we randomly selected one trial from each task, and the
subject “played” their choice on that trial for real money. Playing
a choice was similar to the training tasks; however, rather than
showing a thin target line, subjects saw the specific target and
monetary reward they chose on the selected trial. Subjects rapidly
moved the same cursor to the chosen target; if the cursor hit the
target, the subject won the reward. Since movement control is
inherently variable, there was always a probability that a subject
would miss the target (thereby receiving no reward) in these
motor tasks. Subjects were aware in advance that a random
selection of trials would be played to encourage them to make
decisions based on what they would do in a real-life scenario.
Lottery Design
Construction of lottery pairs is based on the design of Wu et al.
(2009) and follows what we implemented in O’Brien and Ahmed
(2014). Subjects were asked to choose between two lotteries (A
and B), each of which had a different monetary reward ($y and
$z) and probability of winning that reward (p and q). Let us
formulate these lotteries as A($y, p) and B($z, q). For every trial,
there was one “safer” lottery and one “riskier” lottery, classified
based on the variance of each lottery.We consider the lottery with
a higher variance to be the riskier option.
Var[A] = py2(1− p)
Var [B] = qz2
(
1− q) (1)
Lottery pairs were presented in three blocks of 24 trials, for a total
of 72 trials per task. Each lottery pair consisted of a reference
lottery and a varying lottery. The reference lottery was fixed
within a block, whereas the varying lottery changed on each
trial. We used a 4 × 4 outcome-probability matrix to construct
the lottery pairs, as shown in Figure 2A. All reference lotteries
had the same expected value. For the varying lottery, there were
four possible monetary outcomes ranging from $2.40 to $48,
and there were four possible probabilities ranging from 0.05 to
0.95. The diagonal elements of the matrix had nearly the same
expected value and were shown three times per block, while the
remaining off-diagonal elements were shown once per block. For
each subject and task, we randomized the order of the blocks and
the order of the varying lotteries within each block.
An example lottery pair for the ARM choice task is shown in
Figure 2B. In both motor tasks, subjects were shown monetary
rewards and targets of varying widths, but they were not told
which lottery was riskier or safer on any given trial. We
constructed the target sizes to correspond to certain probabilities
of hitting the target. We measured subjects’ mediolateral
endpoint variability during the ARM andWB training tasks, and
we used these variabilities to construct motor lotteries that are
equivalent to economic lotteries with explicit probabilities.
Variability Testing and Motor Lotteries
Prior to the testing phase, subjects had the opportunity to
perform practice movements for both the ARM and WB tasks.
FIGURE 2 | Motor lotteries. (A) Presentation of a motor lottery included a
target with some width and a monetary reward for hitting that target. Arrow
indicates desired direction of cursor movement. Horizontal cursor position at
target determines whether the subject would win the reward. (B) Lotteries
were constructed using a 4× 4 outcome-probability matrix, where each
block is paired with each reference lottery (shown in yellow).
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They performed 100 trials at a prescribed time (750–850ms)
to a thin target line, receiving visual feedback regarding their
mediolateral proximity to the center of the target. The target
line was located at a single distance for all trials within each
movement task (12 cm for ARM and 6 cm for WB). In the
realization of choices phase, the target was located at these same
distances.
We used the mediolateral standard deviation of the cursor
at the target line, σ , to construct the motor lottery target sizes
for testing. That is, we adjusted the width of the target during
testing so that the subject’s probability of hitting the target had
an approximate value. From Wu et al. (2011), the relationship
between the probability of hitting a target, ptarget, and the width
of a target for motor lottery, w, is:
ptarget =
x0+0.5w∫
x0−0.5w
1√
2πσ 2
e(x−x0)
2/2σ 2dx, (2)
where x is the horizontal axis, and x0 is the center of the target.
Measures of Risk-Sensitivity
We employed CPT to estimate subject-specific distortions in
the utilities and probabilities associated with our lotteries. In
CPT, risk-sensitivity can be explained by a distortion in Equation
(1) the utility/value function or Equation (2) the probability
weighting function (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). For our
lottery task, we employ CPT to model the subjective value
function of monetary rewards v(O) and probability weighting
w(P) as:
v (O) = Oα, O ≥ 0 (3a)
w (P) = exp [− (− ln (P))γ ] , 0 < P < 1 (3b)
Parameters for utility and probability weightings are α and
γ , respectively. Distortions in utility and probability (α, γ
6= 1) characterize risk-sensitive behavior, with α < 1 and
γ < 1 indicative of risk-aversion and overweighting of small
probabilities, respectively. Conversely, α > 1 and γ > 1 are
indicative of risk-seeking behavior and underweighting small
probabilities, respectively.
The cumulative prospects of the two lotteries, A($y, p) and
B($z, q), are:
ψA = v
(
y
)
w
(
p
)
ψB = v (z)w(q) (4)
We implemented a logistic choice function with constant noise
(Stott, 2006; Chib et al., 2012), so the probability that a subject
chooses lottery A is given by:
PA =
1
1+ exp[−k (ψA − ψB)]
, (5)
where k is a parameter that accounts for stochasticity in a subject’s
choices. A stochasticity parameter k = 0 characterizes random
choice.
Maximum likelihood estimation was then used to estimate
subject-specific distortions in utility and probability for each task.
On the ith trial, a subject makes a choice ri. Let ri = 1 denote
choosing lottery A, and let ri = 0 denote choosing lottery B.
Our estimated parameters (α, γ , k) for each subject and task
maximized the likelihood function over n trials:
L
(
α, γ, k
) =
n∏
i= 1
P
ri
A(1− PA)ri . (6)
We usedMATLAB’s fminsearch function with multiple restarts to
minimize the negative value of this likelihood function. Because
fminsearch is a minimization algorithm, we must minimize the
negative value of the likelihood in order to find the maximum
likelihood estimate. We compared the resulting parameter fits
from this risk-sensitive model with those from other potential
models, including a risk-neutral model for each subject (with
α = γ = 1 and k left as a free parameter), a risk-sensitive model
using random choices as the input, and a risk-sensitive model
with a scaling factor on the standard deviation of movement
endpoints (σ ′ = cσ , where c is a free parameter) to account for
potential distortions in subjects’ perceptions of their own motor
variability.
As another measure of risk-sensitivity, we computed subjects’
frequency of risky choices (fR) in each task. The fR metric
is determined as a ratio of the number of trials for which a
subject chose the riskier lottery over the safer lottery to the
total number of trials in a task. Although this metric does not
provide information about risk preferences on individual trials, it
provides a global view of risk-seeking (or risk-averse) behavior
that we can use to broadly compare across conditions. We
performed an additional analysis of how changes in the CPT
parameters α and γ would translate to changes in fR (see Section
Relation between CPT and fR). Briefly, fR increases with α, so
increased valuation of rewards would result in a larger number
of risky choices. But the relationship between fR and γ is more
complex (and depends on α), so changes in probability weighting
would not straightforwardly predict the changes in risky choice
behavior.
Increased risk-aversion in movement control could arise from
a reduced valuation of the reward associated with completing a
movement. This would manifest as a lower α value and a lower
fR. Alternatively, risk-aversion could arise from an overweighting
of the chance of a movement error that would lead to a fall. This
would manifest as a reduced γ value, reflecting an overweighting
of small-probability events.
Skin Conductance
We measured changes in skin conductance throughout this
experiment using the BIOPAC MP35 acquisition hardware,
collecting data at 1000Hz. Disposable electrodes were placed on
the subject’s left hand, on the distal phalanx of the index and
middle fingers. Skin conductance level (SCL) for each subject was
calculated as a percent increase over a baseline condition, during
which subjects sat quietly for 5min. SCL data is available for 19
of the 20 subjects; one subject’s SCL data is not presented due to
a calibration error.
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Data Acquisition
In the ARM training task, optical encoders sample the position
of the robot handle at 200Hz. In the WB training task, the dual-
top force platform is comprised of two separate force plates (one
for each foot) and records eight analog voltage signals for each
plate, which we use to compute three-dimensional forces (Fx, Fy,
Fz) and moments (Mx, My, Mz) about the center of each plate at
200Hz. COP for each plate was calculated relative to the center of
the dual-top forceplate, [Cx Cy], as [COPx COPy] = [Cx Cy] + [Mx
My]/Fz , where x and y refer to mediolateral and anteroposterior
axes, respectively. We calculate the combined COP as a weighted
average of the COP for each plate (Winter et al., 1996).
Statistics
We used paired t-tests to compare SCL between the ARM and
WB movements and between the Low and High elevations,
as well as to compare movement endpoint variability between
elevations for each motor task. Pearson’s product-moment
correlation coefficient was computed to evaluate the relationships
across elevation-based changes in SCL, movement variability,
and our risk-sensitivity metrics. We used one-sided paired t-
tests to examine potential differences in CPT parameter fits and
in fR between postural threat conditions, against the alternative
hypothesis that mean values at High elevation were lower
than those at Low elevation (corresponding to increased risk-
aversion with postural threat). We used two-sided paired t-
tests to examine potential differences in CPT parameter fits and
in fR between motor tasks. Permutation testing (with 10,000
permutations) was also employed to compare CPT parameter
fits between conditions without making assumptions about the
underlying distribution of the samples. We used a one-sided
paired t-test to compare scaling factors c on perceived motor
endpoint deviation between tasks, against the post-hoc alternative
hypothesis cWB Low < cARM Low. Using the Akaike information
criterion (AIC), we compared likelihoods of the full risk-sensitive
CPT model (with three free parameters) to those of a risk-
neutral model (using k as the only free parameter), and we also
compared likelihoods of the full risk-sensitive model (computed
using actual subject choices) to those of a risk-sensitive model
using random choices. We additionally used AIC to compare
likelihoods of the full risk-sensitive model (with three free
parameters) to those of the risk-sensitive model that included
the scaling factor on σ (resulting in four free parameters). For
all statistical tests, the significance level was set to 5%. Unless
otherwise stated, mean values are presented as mean [± SEM].
Results
Overview
Both postural threat and motor task impacted risk-sensitivity.
The effect of threat on movement decisions is evident from CPT
model fits: increased elevation resulted in greater overweighting
of small probabilities for WB movement decisions but did not
affect ARM decisions. The effect of motor task on decisions
emerges from differences in fR: subjects chose riskier lotteries
more often in the WB task than in ARM at low elevation. We
believe the disparate risk-sensitivity between motor tasks could
manifest from an underestimation of endpoint variability in the
WB movement.
Postural Threat Increases Physiological Arousal
and Decreases Endpoint Variability
To determine whether the increased elevation led to changes
in physiological arousal, we compared SCL across conditions.
Mean SCL for the Low and High elevation conditions in each
motor task are given in Figure 3. For each condition, SCL was
significantly higher than at Baseline (p < 0.001). Increasing
elevation led to significantly higher skin conductance levels above
the baseline condition in both ARM and WB tasks (p < 0.001),
indicating that subjects responded physiologically to this form of
postural threat. There were no significant differences between the
two motor tasks within elevation conditions [Low: t(19) = 0.48,
p = 0.73; High: t(19) = 2.70, p = 0.99].
Paired t-tests also show a significant difference in variability
between elevation conditions, where σHigh is smaller than σLow
for both the ARM task (p = 0.032) and theWB task (p = 0.034).
Individual and mean endpoint variability in each task and
condition are provided in the Supplemental information.
We performed a correlation analysis of elevation-based
changes in SCL and elevation-based changes in σ . There is a
moderate negative correlation between these factors in the WB
task (ρWB = −0.54; p = 0.01); that is, subjects who exhibited
greater increases in arousal at High elevation also exhibited
greater decreases in variability at High elevation. The correlation
between SCL and σ in the ARM task is weak and not significant
(ρARM = −0.25; p = 0.39).
Postural Threat Affects Decisions for Whole-body
Movements, but Not for Arm-Reaching
Median CPT parameter fits and 95% confidence intervals, taken
across all subjects, are given inTable 1 and illustrated in Figure 4.
For both ARM and WB, these median fits correspond to
exponentially decaying utility (α < 1; ARM Low: 0.68, WB
FIGURE 3 | Skin conductance. Skin conductance levels (SCL) for all threat
conditions relative to Baseline (quiet sitting), wherein 0% indicates no
difference from Baseline. SCL at both elevations was significantly higher than
at Baseline (*p < 0.001), and SCL at the High elevation was significantly higher
than at the Low elevation (**p < 0.001).
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TABLE 1 | Median CPT parameter fits (all subjects).
α γ k
ARM Low 0.68 [0.34, 0.88] 0.97 [0.81, 1.06] 5.23 [3.75, 7.42]
WB Low 0.72 [0.29, 0.96] 0.99 [0.75, 1.06] 4.97 [1.82, 9.03]
ARM High 0.53 [0.29, 0.87] 0.90 [0.67, 1.15] 7.35 [4.08, 19.36]
WB High 0.49 [0.36, 0.92] 0.82* [0.46, 1.06] 4.97 [2.57, 15.21]
Median α, γ , and k values with 95% confidence intervals. Asterisk (*) indicates a significant
difference from Low elevation within motor task (p < 0.05).
Low: 0.72, ARM High: 0.53, WB High: 0.49) and a tendency to
overweight small probabilities in the Low and High elevation
conditions (γ < 1; ARM Low: 0.97, WB Low: 0.99, ARM High:
0.90, WB High: 0.82). In accordance with the fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes implicated in CPT (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992), greater overweighting of small probabilities corresponds
with more risk-seeking behavior for small-probability gains and
more risk-averse behavior for small probability losses. In the
context of movement control, successful target acquisition can be
considered a gain, while movement errors are synonymous with
losses. Thus, a concave utility function and the direction of the
median probability weighting functions suggests increased risk-
aversion toward movement errors at High elevation. Figure 4
also provides individual and mean changes in each parameter
between the Low and High elevation conditions.
We used permutation testing to construct an empirical
distribution of the difference between the median parameters,
thereby making no assumptions about the distribution of these
parameters. This method revealed that γ values in WB High are
significantly smaller than those in WB Low (median value 0.82
at High, compared with 0.99 at Low; p = 0.049), which was also
supported by a paired t-test (p = 0.049). There was no significant
difference between α or γ parameters for any other comparison
between motor tasks or between elevation conditions.
Frequency of Risky Choices Reveals Differences
between Motor Tasks
A comparison of elevation-based changes in SCL with elevation-
based changes in fR yielded a moderate positive correlation in
the WB task (ρWB = 0.54, p = 0.02), so greater physiological
arousal at high elevation was correlated with more risk-seeking
behavior. There was no correlation between elevation-based
changes in SCL and elevation-based changes in fR for the ARM
task (ρARM = −0.01, p = 0.94), so increased physiological
arousal was not related to fR in this motor task.
Figure 5A illustrates average fR for each motor task and
elevation. At Low elevation, average fR is greater in the WB task
than in the ARM task [t(19) = −2.58, p = 0.018; ARM Low:
0.56 [0.03], WB Low: 0.62 [0.04]]. At High elevation, however,
there is no significant difference in fR between the two tasks
[t(19) = −1.23, p = 0.23; ARM High: 0.58 [0.04], WB High:
0.62 [0.04]].
From Figure 5A, the mean fR at High elevation is greater than
(as in ARM) or equal to (as inWB) the mean fR at Low elevation.
We should note, however, that an outlier appears to primarily
drive this trend. That is, one subject dramatically increased fR
going from Low to High elevation in both motor tasks. Upon
removing this subject, the fR means are 0.58 [0.03] for ARM
Low, 0.63 [0.03] for WB Low, 0.58 [0.04] for ARM High, and
0.60 [0.04] for WB High, making the mean fR at High elevation
equal to (as in ARM) or less than (as in WB) the mean fR at
Low elevation. So although Figure 5A suggests that mean fR
increases slightly, or stays the same, with elevation, removing
an outlying subject visually establishes that mean fR actually
decreases slightly, or stays the same, with elevation. We repeated
all analyses with this outlier subject removed; however, there is no
resulting change in our statistical outcomes, nor do our overall
findings differ with the exception of the aforementioned trends
of mean fR compared between Low and High elevations. Thus,
we included the outlying subject for the remainder of the analysis
presented here.
A comparison of individual fR values between the two motor
tasks are shown in Figure 5B for both Low and High elevations.
Here, a data point on the line of unity indicates an identical fR
between the two motor tasks at that elevation, while a data point
above unity represents someone who was more risk-seeking in
the WB task compared with the ARM task, and a data point
below unity represents someone who was more risk-seeking in
the ARM task compared with the WB task. There is a smaller
variance in the difference between ARM and WB fR at Low
elevation (σ 2
fR Low
= 0.0091) than at High elevation (σ 2
fR High
=
0.022). That is, at Low elevation, most subjects have a WB fR
that is nearly equal to or greater than their ARM fR, illustrating
a relatively consistent increase in risky choices during the WB
task compared with the ARM task. But at High elevation, there
is a much wider range of differences in individuals’ fR between
the two motor tasks, with some subjects becoming more risk-
seeking in the WB task and others becoming more risk-seeking
in the ARM task. This explains why we see a significantly higher
fR in the WB task at Low elevation, but there is no significant
difference in fR between the pairedmotor tasks at High elevation.
Generally, subjects’ risk preferences appeared to change
idiosyncratically between movements and threat conditions.
This result is further emphasized in Figure 6A, which charts
individual differences in fR between Low and High elevation
conditions for both motor tasks. While some subjects increased
fR (becoming more risk-seeking) in both tasks, and others
decreased fR (becoming more risk-averse) in both tasks, still
other subjects increased fR in one motor task and decreased it in
the other motor task. There is a weak positive correlation in1fR
between ARM and WB (ρ = 0.29, p = 0.23). Figure 6B plots
the differences fR between ARM and WB at the Low and High
conditions. Here, most points have a negative value on the x-axis,
demonstrating that the majority of subjects had a higher fR in
WB than in ARM at Low elevation and supporting the findings
illustrated in Figure 5.
Underestimating Motor Variability Increases
Frequency of Risky Choices
Perception of motor variability may also influence choice
behavior, since we do not explicitly show subjects the probability
that they will hit a given target. For example, if subjects believe
themselves to be more accurate than they actually are, they
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FIGURE 4 | CPT curves and threat-based changes. Cumulative
prospect theory (CPT) model fits for (A) utility and (B) probability weighting in
the ARM and WB tasks. Curves correspond to median fits for Low elevation
(colored) and High elevation (gray). Probability weighting parameter γ is
significantly lower in WB High than in WB Low (*p = 0.049), suggesting that
there is a greater distortion in probability representation under increased
threat for the WB task. Bar plots show individual and average differences in
each CPT parameter between the Low and High conditions.
would perceive their probabilities of hitting the target to be
higher than those listed in Figure 2A. Conversely, if subjects
believe themselves to be less accurate than they actually are,
they would perceive themselves to have lower probabilities of
hitting the targets (Figure 7A). These perceived values of ptarget ,
determined from Equation (2) according to an alternate standard
deviation of movement endpoints (σ ′ < σ or σ ′ < σ ), would
replace the probabilities used to calculate cumulative prospects in
Equation (4).
We next simulated how perceived probabilities, arising from
σ ′, would affect fR. For each trial, a simulated subject chooses
the lottery with a higher expected value, computed using the
perceived probabilities. If the selected lottery is also riskier
according to the original (undistorted) probabilities, then the
number of risky choices increments. Figure 7B compares fR for
numerous values of σ ′. Underestimating motor variability (σ ′ <
σ ; thinking you are more accurate than you actually are) results
in higher fR, whereas overestimating motor variability (σ ′ < σ ;
thinking you are less accurate than you actually are) results
in lower fR. This analysis verifies that distorted perceptions of
endpoint variability influence choice behavior, and may in part
explain why subjects choose riskier lotteries in the WB task.
We ran our CPT model with a scaling factor on σ as an
additional free parameter (σ ′ = cσ ). Maximum likelihood
estimation fits for this model did not appreciably affect median
values of α or γ . The resulting fits for c were not significantly
different from 1 in any task or elevation condition. In light of
the finding that subjects chose risky lotteries more often in the
WB task at Low elevation, we also tested the post-hoc alternative
hypothesis that cWB Low < cARM Low. The idea that smaller
estimates of motor variability lead to increased fR is substantiated
by the simulation shown in Figure 7. However, a one-tailed
paired t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that there is no
difference between cWB Low and cARM Low (p = 0.74).
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FIGURE 5 | Frequency of risky choices. (A) Mean frequency of risky
choices (fR) for ARM and WB at Low elevation (filled bars) and at High
elevation (outlined bars). (B) Each subject’s fR in the ARM condition
compared with that in the WB condition, at Low elevation (filled circles) and at
High elevation (outlined circles). A data point on the line of unity indicates that
the subject chose the same number of risky lotteries in both motor tasks.
FIGURE 6 | Difference in frequency of risky choices between
elevations and tasks. (A) Each subject’s elevation-based change in fR
for the ARM task compared with the WB task. A positive 1fR
corresponds to a subject who had a higher fR at Low elevation than at
High elevation, thusly becoming more risk-averse with increasing
elevation. A value along the line of unity corresponds to an identical 1fR
in the WB task as in the ARM task, whereas a value above the line of
unity—for example—corresponds to having a greater change in
risk-sensitivity in the WB task than in the ARM task. (B) Each subject’s
motor-based change in fR for Low elevation compared with the High
elevation. A negative 1fR here corresponds to a subject who had a
higher fR in the WB task than in the ARM task. Most points have a
negative value on the x-axis, again illustrating that subjects were more
risk-seeking in WB than in ARM at Low elevation.
Exploration of Alternate CPT Models
To examine the fidelity of our parameter fits, we computed
the AIC from the maximum likelihood of the model. Preferred
models are those with minimum AIC values. We compared
the AIC for the risk-sensitive (full) CPT model with three free
parameters against a risk-neutral (null) model with α and γ
set to unity and with k as the single free parameter. The risk-
sensitive model had a lower AIC than the risk-neutral model for
all subjects; on average, AICfull = 44.8 and AIC0 = 77.5. We also
compared the AIC for the risk-sensitivemodel with actual subject
choices against a risk-sensitive model with random choices. We
generated 100 sets of random choices for each subject and task
and used the maximum likelihood of these sets to calculate an
AIC value for the random choice model. The model with actual
subject choices had a lower AIC for all subjects than a model
with random choices; on average, AICrand = 109.7. Thus, a risk-
sensitive model is better able to describe subjects’ choices, and
these choices do not appear to be random. Including a scaling
factor on σ , to account for potential distortions in perceived
motor variability, did not improve our model fits; on average,
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 9 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 150
O’Brien and Ahmed Movement decisions under threat
FIGURE 7 | Perceived motor variability affects fR. (A) If a subject holds an
inaccurate perception of the standard deviation of their endpoints (dark gray:
σ ′ < σ ; or light gray: σ ′ > σ ), they will have a distorted perception of the
probability they will hit a target in accordance with Euation (2). This distortion
would effectively alter the lottery probabilities shown in Figure 2A according to
their perceived ptarget. (B) Inaccurate perceptions of σ would hypothetically
affect subject choices. Believing yourself to be more accurate than you
actually are (dark gray: σ ′ < σ ) would increase fR, while believing yourself to
be less accurate than you actually are (light gray: σ ′ > σ ) would decrease fR.
In this example, the simulated subject has σ = 0.40 cm, but the pattern of σ ′
affecting fR holds across values of σ .
AICcσ = 46.1. Overall, the 3-parameter risk-sensitive model is
simpler while maintaining the lowest average AIC. A summary of
AIC values for each task and model type is provided in Table 2.
Within-subject Consistency
On average, subjects made consistent choices in 89.8% of the
lotteries for the repeated task, with most discrepancies lying
on the diagonal of the outcome-probability matrix (Figure 2A),
immediately adjacent to the presented reference choice.
The trends we found using a CPT analysis also hold when
we compare the repeated WB Low task with WB High. That is,
using this repeated task, there is still less exponential decay in
utility at Low compared to that at High, and an overweighting
of small probabilities. Importantly, permutation and paired t-
tests still show that γ is significantly greater in this repeated WB
Low than in the original WB High. We also saw no significant
difference in fR between the original WB Low and the repeated
task (paired t-test; p = 0.84), and there is still a larger fR
for the repeated WB Low task than ARM Low (paired t-test;
p < 0.001).
Relation between CPT And fR
Median α and γ values are similar between ARM andWB at Low
elevation, providing no additional information about consistent
distortions that might prompt subjects to choose the risky lottery
more often in WB than in ARM, as established by the fR metric.
At High elevation, median values are again similar between ARM
and WB, but they indicate greater exponential decay of utility
compared with Low elevation, as well as greater underweighting
of large probabilities.
It is pertinent, then, to directly address how our different
risk-sensitivity metrics map onto each other. Particularly, how
does a decrease in probability weighting, as seen in the WB
task, translate to a change in the fR? For each of the lottery
TABLE 2 | CPT model comparison.
AICfull AIC0 AICrand AICcσ
Parameters 3
(fit α, γ , k
with subject
choices)
1
(α = γ = 1, fit k
with subject
choices)
3
(fit α, γ , k
with random
choices)
4
(fit α, γ , k, cσ
with subject
choices)
ARM Low 47.8 80.6 108.6 47.0
WB Low 43.7 76.3 110.1 47.8
ARM High 43.5 80.5 111.1 44.4
WB High 44.3 72.8 111.6 45.2
Mean 44.8 77.5 109.7 46.1
AIC values for four iterations of CPT models. The full risk-sensitive model (AICfull, with
three free parameters) exhibits best performance.
pair presented in this experiment, we simulated the choices that
subject with certain CPT parameters would make. To do so, we
selected α and γ values and calculated the resulting cumulative
prospect of the lotteries from Equation (4). When considering
each lottery pair, the simulation then chose the lottery with
a higher cumulative prospect, which may or may not be the
lottery that is riskier. From the simulation’s choices, we tallied
the number of riskier lotteries chosen, which gave the fR metric
for that set of CPT parameters. It follows then that we can
examine how small changes in α and γ affect fR (Figure 7). From
Figure 8A, we observe that fR generally increases as α increases,
and this pattern holds for different values of γ . For α < 1
(exponential decay of utility), smaller γ values produce larger
difference in fR. From Figure 8B, we can see that changes in
γ have a more complex effect on fR, as fR generally decreases
with γ for small γ , but larger γ can result in increased fR. For
γ < 1 (underweighting of large probabilities), smaller α values
produce larger changes in fR if α≥1. Due to the S-shaped and
asymmetric nature of the probability weighting function, the
specific probabilities given in the lottery pairs will contribute
differently to fR. Figure 8C replicates the mapping of γ onto
fR for a fixed α = 1, and it also shows how the value of
the riskier lottery’s probability contributes to that fR. Thus,
changes in γ have competing effects on low and high probability
lotteries. Since in this experiment the distribution of low and high
probabilities was approximately even, this likely washed out the
effect of a change in γ on fR.
Going from Low to High elevation, our subjects exhibited a
significant decrease in γ for the WB task (median values: γLow =
0.99, γHigh = 0.82). According to our simulation, this would
result in a slightly higher fR for WB High compared with WB
Low. Such an effect is not observed in the fR data (as shown in
Figure 5 in the main text, or with the outlying subject removed),
as it may be washed out by an accompanying decrease in α at
High elevation.
Discussion
Skin conductance measures confirmed that subjects experienced
a physiological response to the postural threat presented in this
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 June 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 150
O’Brien and Ahmed Movement decisions under threat
FIGURE 8 | MappingCPTonto fR.Simulated results depicting how changes
in CPT parameters affect fR. (A) Increases in α generally result in increased fR,
and this effect appears to hold irrespective of γ . (B) Increases in γ generally
result in decreased fR for γ < 1; the overall effect of γ on fR is more complex
and varies notably with value of α. (C) The probability of the riskier lottery
contributes to fR differently in accordance with the shape of the probability
weighting function. Relative contributions of small probabilities, the inflection
probability, and large probabilities are shown for a simulation with α = 1.
experiment, which was also correlated with reduced movement
variability in the WB task. Postural threat and motor task both
affected movement-based risk preferences. Increasing postural
threat in the form of elevation resulted in greater overweighting
of small probabilities in the WB task, which is consistent with
increased risk-aversion toward potential movement errors. We
also found that individuals are more risk-seeking in WB leaning
movements than in ARM at ground level, though this difference
in risk preferences between motor tasks cannot be explained
solely through consistent distortions in utility or probability
weighting.
Irrespective of elevation, the median CPT fits for both motor
tasks align overall with risk-seeking behavior for small probability
gains and risk-averse behavior for small probability losses,
with an exponential decay in utility and an overweighting of
small probabilities for both motor tasks. These risk preferences
contradict the trends found by Wu et al. (2009, 2011)
for a pointing task. When comparing choices in a motor
lottery to those in a classical economic lottery, these authors
found evidence for underweighting of small probabilities in
the motor domain and the typical overweighting of small
probabilities in the economic domain. A functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Wu et al., 2011) revealed that
subjective utility is encoded in the medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) and the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) of the brain.
Probability, on the other hand, is represented differently in
the mPFC depending on whether is it explicitly presented
(as in the economic lottery) or implicitly presented (as in
the motor lottery). Our choice tasks implemented implicit
probabilities for both motor tasks and elevations, so we do not
expect any observed differences in probability weighting to be
confounded by the different neural mechanisms of probability
encoding.
In the WB task, elevation further distorted probability
weighting, with most subjects overweighting small probabilities
to a greater extent when standing atop a 0.8m platform than
when standing at ground level. With concave utility, this shape
of the weighting function agrees with the fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes, describing risk-seeking behavior for small-
probability gains and risk-averse behavior for small-probability
losses. In the context of goal-directed movement, we interpret
gains as target acquisition and losses as movement errors. Greater
overweighting of small probabilities, then, indicates that subjects
adopted a more cautious strategy at high elevation due to
overweighting the probability of errors.
The observed changes in probability weighting appear to align
with the findings of Neyedli and Welsh (2014), who noted a
preference for probability information over value information
when in a motor decision-making task. Participants were offered
choices between target configurations for a pointing movement,
in which a penalty region overlapped the target. By varying
the amount of the point-based penalty (value information) as
well as the distance between the target and penalty (probability
information), the authors found that participants were more
sensitive to probability, preferring configurations with a larger
chance of hitting the target to configurations with lower penalty
values. If individuals process probability more readily than
value during movement selection, it holds that an altered
decision strategy would manifest itself more clearly in probability
weighting than in utility.
Interestingly, subjects only altered probability weighting in
the movement that was more pertinent to the imposed postural
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threat. Successful completion of the WB motor task required
subjects to lean over the edge of the elevated platform, thereby
directly confronting them with the increased threat. Previous
studies of postural threat have noted changes in postural control
when standing or moving at increased elevations—namely,
tighter control of the COP along both the anteroposterior and
mediolateral axes, posterior shifts in the COP, and reduced
displacement and velocity of the COP and center of mass during
voluntary movement. These postural control changes have been
shown to scale with elevation and are more pronounced at
platform heights greater than 1.5m (Adkin et al., 2000, 2002,
2008; Davis et al., 2009; Cleworth et al., 2012). In our experiment,
movement endpoint variability decreased at high elevation for
both the ARM and WB tasks. We observe that subjects are
reducing the extent of their movements in the mediolateral
direction, while the anteroposterier movement extent is fixed
to the target distance. Adkin et al. (2000) previously reported
a linear decrease in mediolateral variability of the COP with
elevation, and we have shown that these results also hold for
a forward leaning movement. Moreover, decreased variability
is moderately correlated with increased SCL in the WB task.
In summary, when performing or planning a movement under
threat, individuals will overweight the probability of a fall when
a threat is salient to the movement. Concurrently, they tighten
control of their posture to reducemotor variability.We anticipate
that the observed changes in choice behavior would also scale
with elevation, resulting in even greater distortions in probability
weighting for the WB task.
We introduced postural threat in this experiment without
altering the motor tasks, allowing us to directly probe the
effect of emotional stress on movement choice behavior. Even
in economic decision making, only recently have systematic
investigations of stress effects been performed. Mild psychosocial
stress, often induced using the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST),
appears to disparately affect gains and losses. For example, in
a modified Game of Dice Task, Pabst et al. (2013) found that
participants did not alter behavior in gains but made fewer risky
decisions in losses after performing the TSST. Such behavior
supports the idea that elevation would increase risk-aversion in
relation to movement errors. Yet, Porcelli and Delgado (2009)
observed an opposite effect, with increased risk-taking for losses
as well as decreased risk-taking for gains. Subjects in this
experiment were stressed by immersing their dominant hand in
an ice-water bath and were asked decide between lotteries of
equal expected value and varying probabilities. Unlike in our
experiment, both of these studies provided feedback about the
outcome after each choice, which may have contributed to their
conflicting findings. Buckert et al. (2014) employed the TSST
and choices between risky lotteries, did not provide trial-by-
trial feedback, and discovered that stress increased risk-taking
in the gain domain (linked with cortisol responses) and did not
significantly affect risk-taking in losses. All of these stress and
decision making studies quantify risk-sensitivity by tallying the
number of risky choices, similar to our fR metric. To date, no
study to our knowledge has examined the effects of stress on
utility and probability weighting. We observed that stress, in
the form of elevation-based postural threat, specifically affected
decision-making processes by further distorting the probability
weighting function.
We had previously assessed risk-sensitivity in movement
using a continuous motor task, wherein subjects used out-and-
back ARM or WB leaning movements to maneuver a cursor
toward the edge of a virtual “cliff” (O’Brien and Ahmed, 2013).
They were given a point score for each trial, with higher rewards
for traversing closer to the cliff edge and a penalty if the cursor
moved beyond the cliff edge. In comparing subject endpoints
with a variability-based model of optimal movement planning,
we saw that subjects moved closer to the cliff edge than was
appropriate for maximizing their expected reward, suggesting
risk-seeking behavior. Moreover, subjects were consistently more
risk-seeking in the WB task than in arm-reaching. However, it
was unclear whether this disparity in risk-sensitivity between
the two types movement resulted from differences in utility
(subjective valuation of the rewards and penalties), differences
in distorted probability weighting (where probability is again
tied to motor variability) or some combination thereof. In
the present study, we specifically explored potential differences
in probability weighting and utility between these movements
using a discrete, choice-based paradigm. Subjects chose riskier
options more frequently in the context of the WB movement
than in ARM at low elevation (ground level), which supports
our previous findings. However, from our CPT analysis, there
were no significant differences in utility or probability weighting
between the two motor tasks at low elevation. Median parameter
fits (Figure 4) further illustrate that distortions in utility and
probability weighting were indeed very similar between motor
tasks within elevations. Another possible explanation for the
dissimilar choice behavior between ARM and WB leaning may
be in subjects’ perceptions of their own motor variability. We
demonstrated that underestimating endpoint variability would
result in inflated fR (see Section Relation between CPT and
fR and Figure 8). Adjusting our risk-sensitive CPT model to
include a scaling factor on endpoint deviation did not produce
better parameter fits, nor did we find significant differences
in the scaling factor between motor tasks. It is likely that a
combination of distortions—in utility, probability weighting, and
perceptions of motor variability—contribute to the observed
choice behavior and effects are difficult to tease out due to
between-subject variance. It also remains to be seen whether
differences in motor costs or subjective valuation of effort would
separately influence risk-sensitivity in the two motor tasks.
During training, we controlled for effort by having subjects
perform the same movement in each trial. During the decision
task, subjects were simply choosing between lotteries, and
movement effort was not immediately realized after making each
choice.
We maintain that the perceived changes in risk preferences
between tasks or conditions results from changes in threat
and motor task rather than from inconsistencies in individual
subjects’ choices. Our subjects repeated one of the motor tasks
(WB leaning at low elevation) during the experimental session,
and were relatively consistent in their choices between the
original task and the repeated task (see Section Within-subject
Consistency). Overall, our findings hold whether we examine the
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original WB task or the repeated task, suggesting that differences
between the low and high elevations and between the arm and
WB movements are not simply due to within-subject choice
fluctuations.
This is the first study to investigate changes in movement
risk-sensitivity under increased postural threat. Our findings
demonstrate that postural threat does affect risk-sensitivity in
movement, and the threat may induce risk-aversion in a salient
movement task. Future work may benefit from harnessing fMRI
(Wu et al., 2009, 2011) or electroencephalography (EEG) (Pardo-
Vazquez et al., 2011, 2014) to examine how threat affects the
encoding of sensorimotor decisions.
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